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THE “BIZARRE RESULT”: THE ALIEN TORT 
STATUTE, THE WESTFALL ACT, AND THE 
PROBLEM OF WARTIME DETENTIONS  
IN ALI v. RUMSFELD 
Kyle T. Sullivan* 
Abstract: On June 21, 2011, in Ali v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia held that constitutional protections do not 
apply to noncitizen enemy detainees in a foreign theater of war, and that 
the Westfall Act immunizes federal employees from suits brought by such 
detainees under the Alien Tort Statute. This decision adds to the uncer-
tainty about what recourse, if any, noncitizen enemy detainees have for 
abuses committed by their U.S. military captors. 
Introduction 
 Afghan and Iraqi citizens claiming they were tortured, abused, and 
detained by the United States military filed an action against former 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and other high-ranking military 
officers.1 The plaintiffs alleged that their treatment violated the United 
States Constitution, the law of nations, and the Geneva Convention IV.2 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed 
the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.3 The plaintiffs appealed, argu-
ing that their treatment violated their Fifth and Eighth Amendment 
rights, and that the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) provided them with a stat-
utory cause of action against the defendants in their individual capaci-
ties.4 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
upheld the district court decision, affirming that the Constitution does 
not protect noncitizen enemy detainees in a foreign theater of war, and 
that the Westfall Act provides absolute immunity to federal employees 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2011–2012). 
1 See In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d sub 
nom. Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
2 See id. at 91. 
3 Id. at 119. 
4 See Ali, 649 F.3d at 765 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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sued under the ATS.5 Judge Edwards dissented, concluding that the 
ATS falls within the Westfall Act’s exception for United States statutes 
because it is both jurisdictional and substantive.6 To support this posi-
tion, Judge Edwards reasoned that the United States Supreme Court’s 
reading of the ATS in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain “open[s] the door a crack 
to the possible recognition of new causes of action under international 
law . . . .”7 These differing interpretations of Sosa, the ATS, and its rela-
tionship to the Westfall Act turned on the issue of whether the ATS is 
strictly jurisdictional or whether it also provides a statutory cause of ac-
tion.8 The possibility of redress for noncitizen enemy detainees was 
broached by Judge Edwards but remains unresolved.9 
I. Detainees’ Abuse, Complaint, and Trial 
 From 2003 to 2004, four Afghan and five Iraqi citizens were de-
tained by United States military forces because of hostilities in those 
countries.10 The Afghan citizens were held at U.S. detention facilities 
throughout Afghanistan, and the Iraqi citizens were held at Abu Ghraib 
prison and other facilities in Iraq.11 The prisoners were held for varying 
amounts of time—some remained in U.S. custody for months, some for 
a year, and some were detained multiple times.12 
                                                                                                                      
5 Id. at 770–73, 775; see Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (stating that “dis-
trict courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”); Federal Tort 
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2675(a) (2006). See generally Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2006) 
(providing immunity to federal employees for torts committed in the scope of employ-
ment and substituting the United States as the sole defendant to a claim for violation of 
the Federal Tort Claims Act). 
6 See Ali, 649 F.3d at 791 (Edwards, J., dissenting); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(B) 
(providing that the Westfall Act’s grant of immunity does not apply to claims alleging viola-
tion of a United States statute). 
7 Ali, 649 F.3d at 780 (Edwards, J., dissenting) (quoting Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 
1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2009)); see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004). 
8 See Ali, 649 F.3d at 778 (majority opinion); id. at 791(Edwards, J., dissenting). 
9 See id. at 792–93 (Edwards, J., dissenting). See generally Karen Lin, Note, An Unintended 
Double Standard of Liability: The Effect of the Westfall Act on The Alien Tort Claims Act, 108 Col-
um. L. Rev. 1718, 1719, 1757 (2008) (describing the historic use of the ATS as guarantor of 
international human rights in United States courts). 
10 In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d sub nom. 
Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The court took judicial notice of the 
fact that the United States was engaged in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Id. at 102. 
11 Id. at 88. 
12 Id. 
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 While the length of the prisoners’ detentions varied, the abuses 
they suffered at the hands of the U.S. military were largely similar.13 
Among the more egregious offenses alleged by the prisoners were ex-
tended periods of sensory, food and water deprivation; fierce beatings 
resulting in permanent injury; withholding of essential medication and 
failure to address life threatening injuries; electrical shock treatment 
resulting in unconsciousness; prolonged exposure to extreme heat; re-
peated anal probes; and various forms of psychological abuse including 
racial epithets, death threats, simulated sodomy, exposure to aggressive 
dogs, and confinement in cages with lions.14 
 Based on these allegations, the prisoners initially filed complaints 
in four separate jurisdictions against Donald Rumsfeld, the former Sec-
retary of Defense, and other high-ranking military officers responsible 
for directing the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.15 On June 17, 2005, the 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the complaints 
and transferred them to the district court.16 On January 5, 2006, the 
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint seeking declaratory relief for 
multiple causes of action.17 First, the plaintiffs alleged that the circum-
stances of their detention violated their Fifth Amendment right to due 
process, and their Fifth and Eighth Amendment protection from cruel 
and unusual punishment.18 Pursuant to the ATS and Geneva Conven-
tion IV, the plaintiffs also alleged violations of the law of nations prohi-
bition against torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.19 In 
response, the defendants filed separate motions to dismiss each claim 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.20 
                                                                                                                      
13 Id. at 88–90. 
14 See id. “These are only some of the many examples of abuse allegedly inflicted on 
the plaintiffs . . . .” Id. at 90. 
15 See Detainees, 479 F. Supp.2d at 90. All claims against the Secretary of Defense 
“[sought] to impose liability both individually and in his official capacity, whereas the 
claims against the other defendants [sought] to impose only individual liability.” Id. 
16 Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006). 
17 Detainees, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 90–91. 
18 Id. at 91. 
19 See id. The plaintiffs abandoned a similar claim under the Third Geneva Convention 
“once it became clear that the government was not characterizing the plaintiffs as prison-
ers of war . . . .” Id. at 91 n.4. 
20 Id. at 91. 
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A. Constitutional Claims Under Bivens 
 The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fifth and Eighth Amend-
ments pursuant to the theory of tort liability for constitutional viola-
tions established in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics.21 Bivens held that plaintiffs could recover monetary damages for 
constitutional violations by federal officials.22 The defendants argued, 
and the district court agreed, that the Constitution did not protect 
nonresident aliens injured in a foreign theater of war.23 The district 
court held that the defendants were subject to qualified immunity be-
cause the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were not clearly established at 
the time of the violations.24 Even if the defendants had knowingly vio-
lated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, the court held that “special 
factors,” namely the need for judicial deference in the realm of foreign 
policy, counseled against a Bivens remedy.25 
B. The ATS and the Westfall Act 
 The district court also considered whether the Westfall Act pre-
cluded a finding of personal liability against the defendants under the 
Alien Tort Statute.26 The defendants argued that they were personally 
immune to suits brought pursuant to the ATS because whenever a fed-
eral employee commits a tort within the scope of his employment, the 
Westfall Act substitutes the United States government as a defendant 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).27 The plaintiffs argued that 
the Westfall Act did not apply to its law of nations and Geneva Conven-
                                                                                                                      
21 Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 
(1971); Detainees, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 93. 
22 See 403 U.S. at 397. 
23 Detainees, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 94–95. Compare Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 
(1950) (holding that nonresident aliens detained in a foreign theater of war are not enti-
tled to constitutional protections), with Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 110, 126 
(D.D.C. 2011) (holding that United States citizens detained in foreign theaters of war are 
entitled to constitutional protections). 
24 See Detainees, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 108–09. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit declined to ex-
ercise the optional Saucier v. Katz approach to Bivens claims, which requires a court to de-
termine whether a constitutional right has been violated before considering whether the 
right was clearly established. See Ali, 649 F.3d at 770 n.11, 772–73 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The 
D.C. Circuit declined to use the Saucier approach because it “runs counter to the older, 
wiser judicial counsel not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudica-
tion is unavoidable . . . .’” See id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 241 (2009)). 
25 See Ali, 649 F.3d at 773–74. 
26 Detainees, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 111–12. 
27 See Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (2006); Detainees, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 111–12, 
114. 
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tion IV claims because: (1) by its language, the Westfall Act applies only 
to negligent torts and not to intentional torts; (2) the defendants were 
acting outside the scope of their employment; and (3) the law of na-
tions claims fell within the Westfall Act’s exception for violations of 
United States statutes.28 The district court disposed of the plaintiffs’ 
first two arguments, finding that the Westfall Act was intended to apply 
to negligent and intentional torts alike, and that the defendants were 
acting within the scope of their employment when they committed the 
alleged acts.29 
 In determining whether the ATS fell within the Westfall Act’s ex-
ception for violations of United States statutes, the district court relied 
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.30 In Sosa, 
the Supreme Court held that “the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creat-
ing no new causes of action . . . .”31 The district court reasoned that be-
cause the ATS did not create new causes of action, it was not subject to 
violation and therefore not eligible for the Westfall Act’s exception.32 
Consequently, the district court applied the Westfall Act and held that 
the defendants were entitled to absolute immunity for the ATS 
claims.33 The United States was substituted as the defendant in place of 
former Secretary Rumsfeld and the other military officers, and the 
court dismissed the plaintiffs’ ATS claims under the FTCA.34 Likewise, 
                                                                                                                      
28 See Detainees, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 110–12, 114. 
29 See id. at 111, 114. “[W]rongful” conduct within the meaning of the Westfall Act in-
cludes all conduct that has “no legal sanction,” and thereby includes intentional torts. See 
id. at 111. The Court also found that “detaining and interrogating enemy aliens . . . [is] 
incidental to the conduct the defendants were employed to perform.” Id. at 114. 
30 See id. at 112; see also § 2679(b)(2)(B) (stipulating that the Westfall Act’s grant of 
immunity to U.S. government employees does not extend to civil actions “brought for a 
violation of a statute of the United States under which such action against an individual is 
otherwise authorized.”); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713, 724 (2004). 
31 See 542 U.S. at 724. 
32 See Detainees, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 112. The district court relied on two of the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s earlier holdings in making this determination. See id. at 112; see also Harbury v. Hay-
den, 444 F. Supp. 2d 19, 38 (D.D.C. 2006) (“[T]he ATCA cannot be the subject of ‘a viola-
tion’ of a federal statute because the ATCA provides no substantive rights that could be the 
subject of any claimed violation.”), aff’d, 522 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 
414 F. Supp. 2d 26, 38 (D.D.C. 2006) (“The plain language of the ATCA . . . does not con-
fer rights nor does it impose obligations or duties that, if violated, would trigger the West-
fall Act’s statutory exception.”), vacated sub nom. Rasul v. Myers, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008). 
33 See Detainees, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 114–15. The request for declaratory relief was also 
denied because it was not predicated on any substantive claims. Id. at 118–19. 
34 See id. at 114–15; see also Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2006) (per-
mitting dismissal of tort claims against the United States for failure to exhaust administra-
tive remedies); § 2679(d)(1) (substituting the United States as the defendant for tort ac-
tions against U.S. employees acting within the scope of their employment). 
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the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ independent Geneva Convention IV 
claims on the grounds that the Convention is not “self-executing” and 
can be enforced only through “legislation or diplomacy.”35 The plain-
tiffs appealed the constitutional and ATS claims to the D.C. Circuit.36 
                                                                                                                     
II. On Appeal: Differing Interpretations of Sosa, the ATS, and 
the Westfall Act 
 The D.C. Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court’s holding 
with regard to the plaintiffs’ Fifth and Eighth Amendment Bivens 
claims.37 The sole point of contention between the majority and the 
dissent involved the question of whether the ATS is jurisdictional or 
substantive, and thus whether it is subject to the Westfall Act’s excep-
tion for statutory violations.38 Although the majority and the dissent on 
the D.C. Circuit both rested their interpretations of the ATS on the Su-
preme Court’s holding in Sosa, they arrived at different conclusions.39 
A. Sosa: The Supreme Court Weighs in on the ATS 
 The plaintiff in Sosa, like the plaintiffs in Ali, argued “that the ATS 
was intended not simply as a jurisdictional grant, but as authority for 
the creation of a new cause of action for torts in violation of interna-
tional law.”40 The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the “ATS is a 
jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action,” and that it was 
“enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a 
cause of action for the modest number of international law violations 
with a potential for personal liability at the time.”41 This jurisdictional 
reading was supported, the Court found, by the ATS’s original designa-
tion as a grant of mere “cognizance,” and by the placement of the ATS 
 
35 See Detainees, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 116–17. 
36 Ali, 649 F.3d at 769. 
37 See Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 768–69, 774; id. at 778–79 (Edwards, J., dissenting) 
(D.C. Cir. 2011). The D.C. Circuit found that Boumediene v. Bush, principles of judicial re-
straint, and the “special factors” of Johnson v. Eisentrager all warranted dismissal. See id. at 
772–74 (majority opinion). Compare Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 768–69 (2008) 
(holding that constitutional protections apply to enemies detained in an area of perma-
nent U.S. sovereignty), with Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778–79 (1950) (holding 
that practical factors militated against extending constitutional protections to detainees in 
foreign theaters of war). 
38 See Ali, 649 F.3d at 779 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
39 See id. at 778 (majority opinion); id. at 779 (Edwards, J., dissenting); see also Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724, 729 (2004). 
40 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713; see Ali, 649 F.3d at 777. 
41 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. 
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in section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789—a statute “otherwise exclu-
sively concerned with federal-court jurisdiction . . . .”42 The Justices dif-
fered as to the scope of the common law claims implicated by the ATS, 
but the Sosa Court’s interpretation was unequivocal: the ATS is a juris-
dictional statute, it extends federal jurisdiction to a limited number of 
claims arising out of the law of nations, and those claims are confined 
to the common law.43 
B. The Ali Majority: The ATS as Jurisdictional Grant 
 Though seemingly clear after Sosa, the scope of the ATS led the Ali 
majority and dissent down divergent paths, and ultimately to different 
outcomes.44 Recognizing the similarity between the Ali and Sosa plain-
tiffs’ arguments, the Ali majority adopted the logic of the Sosa major-
ity.45 As in Sosa, the Ali majority found that historical context, as well as 
the text of the original ATS, clearly demonstrated the statute’s “strictly 
jurisdictional nature.”46 The Ali majority concluded that the Sosa hold-
ing alone was sufficient to defeat the plaintiffs’ argument that the ATS 
provides an independent cause of action within the statutory violation 
exception to the Westfall Act.47 
 The majority bolstered its interpretation of the ATS by comparing 
it to the Supreme Court’s treatment of the Gonzalez Act in United States 
                                                                                                                      
42 Id. at 713 (internal quotations omitted). In drawing this conclusion, the Court cited 
Alexander Hamilton’s use of “jurisdiction” interchangeably with “cognizance” in Federalist 
No. 81. See id.; The Federalist No. 81, at 484–85 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
43 See 542 U.S. at 714, 729–30; id. at 749–50 (Scalia, J., concurring). The majority rec-
ognized, and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer agreed, that the scope of the federal common 
law was limited by Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. See id. at 726, 729 (majority opinion); id. at 751 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 760 (Breyer, J., concurring); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64, 79–80 (1938). The Court nonetheless reserved the right to “create federal com-
mon law rules in interstitial areas of particular federal interest,” such as the law of nations 
under the ATS, because “Erie did not in terms bar” it from doing so. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 
726, 729. In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia advocated a more limited conception of 
the common law under the ATS. See id. at 746, 749–50 (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding that 
the law of nations at the time of the ATS’s creation was limited to the “accepted practices 
of nations in their dealings with one another,” including laws governing piracy and the 
treatment of ambassadors, and that recognizing new claims under the ATS was a “ques-
tionable enterprise”). 
44 See Ali, 649 F.3d at 778; id. at 779 (Edwards, J., dissenting); see also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 
724. 
45 See Ali, 649 F.3d at 776–77. 
46 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713–14; see Ali, 649 F.3d at 777. 
47 See Ali, 649 F.3d at 776. 
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v. Smith.48 In Smith, the Supreme Court decided that the Gonzalez Act 
does not fall within the Westfall Act’s statutory violation exception be-
cause it does not impose any obligations or duties of care.49 The Court 
thus concluded that the Westfall Act’s grant of immunity applied.50 Be-
cause the ATS, like the Gonzalez Act, does not impose “any obligations 
or duties of care,” the Ali majority held that it was not eligible for the 
Westfall Act’s statutory violation exception.51 
 The majority also acknowledged a source of interpretive difference 
raised by the Sosa majority and the Ali dissent.52 The majority acknowl-
edged that the Sosa Court did not expressly preclude the argument that 
the ATS “effectively incorporates the law of nations” in statutory form 
when it declared “that the domestic law of the United States recognizes 
the law of nations . . . .”53 Nevertheless, the Ali majority decided that 
the appropriate interpretation of Sosa was that the ATS incorporates 
the law of nations through the common law, and not through United 
States statutory law.54 On the strength of Sosa and the likeness of the 
ATS to the Gonzalez Act, the Ali majority concluded that the ATS does 
not fall within the Westfall Act’s statutory violation exception.55 The 
majority therefore upheld the district court’s grant of absolute immu-
nity to the defendants, allowed the United States to substitute itself as 
the sole defendant under the FTCA, and dismissed the FTCA claims for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.56 
                                                                                                                     
C. The Ali Dissent: The ATS as a Substantive Statute Within the Westfall 
Exception 
 Judge Edwards began the analysis in his Ali dissent not by address-
ing the scope of the ATS as defined in Sosa, but by referencing his own 
interpretation of the ATS in his concurrence in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab 
 
48 See id. at 775–76; see also United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 174–75 (1991). 
49 See 499 U.S. at 174–75. 
50 See id. 
51 See 649 F.3d at 776, 778. 
52 See id. at 777–78. 
53 See id. at 778 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729). Based on the language in Sosa, the Ali 
dissent reasoned that because the ATS “incorporates the law of nations,” a violation of the 
law of nations constitutes a violation of the ATS within the meaning of the Westfall Act’s 
statutory violation exception. Id. at 788–91 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
54 See id. at 778 (majority opinion). 
55 See id. at 776–78. 
56 See Ali, 649 F.3d at 775. The plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies as 
required by the FTCA because they did not file administrative claims with the military or 
the Department of Defense before bringing suit. Id. 
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Republic.57 In Tel-Oren, a D.C. Circuit case that predates the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Sosa by approximately twenty years, Judge Edwards 
reasoned that the ATS provides both federal jurisdiction and “a right to 
sue for alleged violations of the law of nations.”58 Judge Edwards also 
noted his disagreement with Judge Bork, who filed a separate concur-
rence in Tel-Oren reasoning that the ATS required “an explicit grant of a 
cause of action . . . to enforce principles of international law . . . .”59 
The impasse led Judges Bork and Edwards to agree that the character 
and purpose of the ATS required “clarification” from the Supreme 
Court.60 Judge Edwards concluded that the Supreme Court provided 
this clarity in Sosa when it rejected Judge Bork’s reading, requiring “an 
explicit grant of a cause of action” to accompany the ATS, and instead 
held that claims for violations of the law of nations could be brought 
under the ATS alone.61 
 With this principle “established,” Judge Edwards asserted that the 
Westfall Act does not immunize federal employees from ATS actions 
because such immunity would be contrary to Congress’s intent.62 Im-
munizing federal employees from ATS actions would allow plaintiffs to 
bring suit against foreign officials but not against United States offi-
cials.63 According to Judge Edwards, Congress did not intend this “bi-
zarre result.”64 
 More important is Judge Edwards’s distinction between statutes 
that can be violated and statutes that merely limit liability.65 Judge Ed-
wards first distinguished between the plaintiffs’ proposed use of the 
ATS in Ali and the proposed use of the Gonzalez Act in Smith, one of 
the dispositive authorities cited by the Ali majority.66 According to 
Judge Edwards, Smith was “plainly inapposite” because the Gonzalez Act 
merely limits liability, while the ATS imposes liability by incorporating 
                                                                                                                      
57 See id. at 784 (Edwards, J., dissenting) (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 
F.2d 774, 780–81 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)). 
58 726 F.2d at 780 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
59 Id. at 801 (Bork, J., concurring); see Ali, 649 F.3d at 784 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
60 See 726 F.2d at 775 (Edwards, J., concurring); id. at 822–23 (Bork, J., concurring). 
61 See Ali, 649 F.3d at 784–85 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
62 See id. at 785–86. 
63 See id. at 789. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. at 790. 
66 See Ali, 649 F.3d at 790 (Edwards, J., dissenting). Like the Westfall Act, the Gonzalez 
Act is a grant of federal employee immunity that substitutes the U.S. government as the 
defendant in suits against military medical personnel for torts committed in the scope of 
their employment. Id. 
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the law of nations.67 In Judge Edwards’s analysis, this incorporation 
means that the ATS is a statute capable of being violated and that it 
thus falls within the Westfall Act’s statutory violation exception.68 Judge 
Edwards also found that the ATS is unlike the federal question jurisdic-
tion established by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the ATS does more than 
merely extend jurisdiction.69 Judge Edwards instead compared the ATS 
to section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 
noting that even though the text of the LMRA only references jurisdic-
tion, the Supreme Court has held that it creates a cause of action.70 For 
these reasons, Judge Edwards found that it would be more in keeping 
with Congress’s intent and the role of the ATS as a guarantor of human 
rights to read it as a statute within the meaning of the Westfall Act’s 
statutory violation exception.71 Nevertheless, Judge Edwards main-
tained that this is “‘an area of the law that cries out for clarification by 
the Supreme Court.’”72 
III. Restoring Sosa, Rethinking the ATS 
 Judge Edwards’s effort to square his interpretation with Congres-
sional intent departed from the binding authority of Sosa and produced 
a dubious conception of the ATS.73 By relying on his own interpreta-
tion of the ATS in Tel-Oren rather than the Supreme Court’s more re-
                                                                                                                      
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. at 790–91; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (“The district courts shall have orig-
inal jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States.”). 
70 See Ali, 649 F.3d at 790–91 (Edwards, J., dissenting) (citing Textile Workers Union of 
Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957)). Section 301(a) provides federal jurisdic-
tion for contract disputes involving labor organizations, regardless of the amount in con-
troversy or citizenship of the parties. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006). 
71 See Ali, 649 F.3d at 792 (Edwards, J., dissenting); Lin, supra note 9, at 1719. 
In the past thirty years, the [ATS] has become an important instrument in 
advancing human rights claims before U.S. Courts. In light of this exceptional 
statute, the Westfall Act’s effect of immunizing U.S. officials is doubly ironic: 
Not only has the country that led the way in allowing aliens to vindicate their 
rights against foreign officials maintained official immunity for its own offi-
cials even in the face of modern human rights accountability, but it has also 
done so unintentionally. 
Lin, supra note 9, at 1719 (internal citations omitted). 
72 Ali, 649 F.3d at 792 (Edwards, J., dissenting) (quoting Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775 (Ed-
wards, J., concurring)). 
73 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004); Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 
778 (D.C. Cir. 2011); id. at 792 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
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cent interpretation in Sosa, Judge Edwards laid a questionable founda-
tion for his dissent.74 After all, the Supreme Court’s definitive interpre-
tation of the ATS in Sosa obviated Judge Edwards’s concurrence in Tel-
O .ren
 cause of action within the meaning of the Westfall 
ct’s
Yet the Ali majority established that the mere grant of jurisdiction for 
                                                                                                                     
75 
 Furthermore, although the Sosa Court did not embrace Judge 
Bork’s contention that the ATS must be paired with a more “‘explicit 
grant of a cause of action,’” it does not follow that the Court validated 
Judge Edwards’s view.76 Rather than confirming Judge Edwards’s view 
that the ATS incorporated the law of nations as part of U.S. statutory 
law, Sosa designated the common law as the remedy for ATS claims.77 
As the Ali majority noted, “[t]he Sosa Court’s statement ‘that the do-
mestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations’ . . . is best 
understood to refer to the common law of the United States, not its 
statutory law.”78 Thus, Judge Edwards’s interpretation of the ATS was 
right as to the fact of incorporation, but wrong as to the mode of in-
corporation.79 Sosa made clear, and the Ali majority confirmed, that 
ATS claims are limited to the common law and that the ATS does not 
create a statutory
A  statutory violation exception.80 
 Judge Edwards’s comparison of the ATS to the Gonzalez Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1331, and the LMRA is also questionable.81 Judge Edwards 
posited that the ATS is less like the Gonzalez Act and 28 U.S.C § 1331 
and more like the LMRA because it is not just jurisdictional but also 
substantive.82 This is so, Judge Edwards reasoned, because the LMRA 
and the ATS both provide federal jurisdiction for common law claims.83 
 
74 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724; Ali, 649 F.3d at 776–77; id. at 784 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
75 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724; Ali, 649 F.3d at 776–77; Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 
726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring). 
76 See Ali, 649 F.3d at 784–85 (Edwards, J., dissenting) (quoting Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 
801 (Bork, J., concurring)) (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724); see also In re Jamuna Real Estate, 
445 B.R. 490, 496 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010) (“A concurring opinion, while persuasive, is not 
binding.”). 
77 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724; Ali, 649 F.3d at 788, 790–91 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
78 Ali, 649 F.3d at 777–78; see id. at 788–91 (Edwards, J., dissenting); see also Sosa, 542 
U.S. at 714, 726, 729–30; id. at 746, 749–50 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 751 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring); id. at 760 (Breyer, J., concurring); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79–80 
(1938); supra notes 43, 52–54 and accompanying text. 
79 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714, 729–30; Ali, 649 F.3d at 778. 
80 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724; Ali, 649 F.3d at 776–78. 
81 See Ali, 649 F.3d at 776–77; id. at 790–92 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
82 See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006); Ali, 649 F.3d at 790–91 (Edwards, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957)). 
83 See Ali, 649 F.3d at 791 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
70 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice Vol. 32: E. Supp. 
ive.86 
                                                                                                                     
federal common law claims does not create a statutory cause of ac-
tion.84 On the contrary, the ATS is “best understood” as merely refer-
encing common law claims, not restyling them as statutory rights.85 If a 
statutory grant of jurisdiction does not make the Gonzalez Act or 28 
U.S.C § 1331 substantive, it should not make the ATS substant
Conclusion 
 The majority in Ali v. Rumsfeld correctly determined that the Alien 
Tort Statute is a grant of jurisdiction that does not create a statutory 
cause of action. The majority thus affirmed the district court’s decision 
to apply the Westfall Act to the plaintiffs’ claims, which immunized the 
individual defendants and substituted the U.S. Government as the sole 
defendant under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Upon the Government’s 
motion, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies. Judge Edwards’s reading of the Su-
preme Court’s holding in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Alien Tort 
Statute were not adopted by the Ali majority, but nonetheless broached 
the question of redress for noncitizen enemy detainees abused by the 
U.S. military in foreign theaters of war. Military abuse of detainees un-
dermines established precepts of American foreign policy, but it is un-
clear whether meaningful recourse is available. Administrative com-
plaints by enemy combatants may not find sympathy in the military or 
the Department of Defense, and judicial solutions are likely to run 
afoul of “special factors” such as necessary judicial deference in the 
realm of foreign policy. Indeed, it appears that the Westfall Act and its 
victims will continue to cry out for clarification. 
 
84 See id. at 776–77 (majority opinion). 
85 See id. at 778. 
86 See id. at 776–78; id. at 790–92 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
